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CHAPTER I
History of the Catilinarian Conspiracy.
The first century B.

c.

marks what is

probably one of the most interesting and exciting eras in
history, likewise one of the bloodi8st and most unfortunate.
For with the year 90 B.C. and the Social War, in which the
Italian allies were forced to resort to arms in a vain attempt to gain the franchise, came the first intimation that
the structure of the great Roman Republic was crumbling.
From the next blow Rome never fully recovered--the excesses
of the popular leaders .Marius and Cinna and the consequent
Civil War between Marius and Sulla.

Sulla indeed was the

eventual victor, and he reaped a bloody revenge.

There

followed in quick succession the insurrection in Spain under
Setorius and the rebellion at home of the consul Lepidus,

1

the revolt of the slaves under Spartacus, and the last desperate struggles between Pompey and Caesar, Brutus and Augustus, Augustus and Antony, until at the battle of Actium
in 31 B.C. of the glorious republic that was Rome there remained nothing but a shambles and a ruin.

The conspiracy

of Catiline was another in the long series of catastrophies
that befell the Roman state.
January 1, 65 B.C. was a day of marked
unrest even in the Rome of those turbulent times.

Armed
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bands of men swept through the streets of the city, and
there were rumors abroad of a plot to assasinate the consuls
at the inaugural ceremonies that day.

Crassus, the wealthiest

man in Rome, would then usurp the dictatorship,

2

nominating

inturn as his magister eguitum the young and ambitious Caius
Julius Caesar.

So the rumor ran.

The time indeed was ripe

for such an attempt, for with Pompey and the army busily
engaged in far off Syria and Armenia, and the whole of Italy
ungarrisoned, there was at Rome no force capable of suppressing any such organized outbreak.

3

At the last moment, however,

the whole affair fell through because Crassus for some unknown reason failed to put in an appearance and Caesar was
consequently prevented from giving the appointed signal to
4

the conspirators.

·what role Catiline played, whether he

was really the moving spirit behind the whole affair or was
merely acting as the tool of Crassus and Caesar is a question
that will later command a more detailed treatment.

At any

rate, thus ended the fiasco known as the first or Minor Conspiracy of Catiline, so called because the second conspiracy
was a direct outgrowth of this earlier one.
Catiline had desired to run for the consulship in 66 B.C., but was prevented from doing so because he
was unable to present himself as a candidate within the le5

gitimate number of days,

since he was under an indictment
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for the maladministration of his province when propraetor in
Africa.

Despite the clearest evidence against him, he was

finally acquitted owing to the wholesale bribery and corrup6

tion of the jurors and the praevaricatio

or collusion of

his accuser, the notorious P. Clodius Pulcher.

Nothing

daunted, he.again sued for the consulship in 64 B.
time in company with

c.

c.,

this

Antonius, a man of scarcely better

reputation than his own, and, it is alleged, with the ready
approbation and financial assistance of both Crassus and
Caesar.

It was, in fact, the fear inspired by tlus combinatio

that induced the Senate and the nobles to throw their support
to Cicero, Catilinets rival, much against their will, for
Cicero was a "novus homo" while Catiline was descended from
one of the ancient patrician families of Rome, that of the
Sergii. Cicero and Antonius were elected consuls.

Thereupon

Cicero promptly purchased the good-will of r..is colleagus and
a free hand in the management of affairs at Rome by resigning
to .Antonius the rich province of Macedonia which had been
alloted to him, in place of the less lucrative province of
Gaul.

Catiline, however, disappointed in his hopes of gaining

by legitimate methods the power he desired, resolved upon a
desperate expedient.

He formulated a plot to overthrow the

existing government and to mount the curule chair by blood
and the sword if no other way was open to him.
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With this intention of using force, he
gathered about himself the worst elements in the city.

Cicero

in the Second Oration against Catiline, delivered to the
people in the forum on November 8, gives a detailed inventory
of the various groups that went to make up Catilinets following.

In the first place, there were the wealthy who were

submerged in debt and anxious for the Novae Tabulae

7

or

repudiation of all debts; secondly, the office seekers, men
who wanted power and the chance to rule; thirdly, the veterans
of Sulla, tired of fighting the soil and looking for new
spoils and plunder; fourthly, the spendthrifts and bankrupts
for whom any change was for the better; fiftluy, the rabble
and riff-raff of the cityts slums, and, lastly, Catiline's
more intimate associates and friends, including the reckless
youths of the city whom Catiline had personally seduced and
led astray.

Among this last group was a certain Quintus

Curius, an utterly untrustworthy individual, who to retain
the favor of his mistress Fulvia, fell to boasting of his
intended misdeeds.

Fulvia in turn promptly reported her in-

formation to Cicero, and the latter secured her as his agent
and spy.
Alarmed by the reports of the plot, Cicero
convoked

8

the Senate on October 21, 63 B.C. and informed them

that he had reason to know that an armed outbreak was planned
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for the 27th. of that month.
the Senate,

aft~r

The following day, October 22

considering the statement of the consul,

passed the "ultimum Senatus Consultum" or, as it was termen,
the "Extreme Decree", charging the consuls to take care that
the commonwealth suffer no harm, conferring on them supreme
power and inaugurating a state of martial law.

Levies were

likewise ordered throughoutitaly, and the consul Antonius
and the praetor Metellus Celer

9

were directed to take the

field against the insurgents, who, appeared in arms on October
27 at Faesulae in Etruria under Gaius Manlius, a veteran
centurion of Sulla and Catiline' s second in command.

!'rot

long after, Catiline was arraigned under the Plautian law,
which was directed against acts of violence and breaches of
the peace.

He realized his affairs were becoming desperate

and that he must act quickly.
On the night, then, of November 6, at the
home of Marcus Porcius Laeca in the street of the Scythemakers, he assembled his principal associates.

First, he

pledged them to faith and secrecy, and then rehearsed in detail their two-fold plan---the firing of the city at several
strategic points and the simultaneous advance on thecity of
the army from Etruria under Manlius.

According to the ac-

count of Sallust, the pledge was sealed by the drinking of a
bowl of human blood mixed with wine.

Concerning this episode
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Plutarch in his life of Cicero giv8s an even more sensational
account, but his story is uncorroborated, and would, in fact,
seem to lack any foundation in reality.
Before dismissing the assemblage Catiline
explained to them how necessary it was for the success of
their enter.prise that Cicero should be immediately dispatched.
Gaius Cornelius, a Roman knight, and Lucius Vargunteius, a
senator, volunteered to relieve Catiline of any anxiety on
this score, and, since the meeting had been prolonged to the
early hours, they set off a little later with their escort
for Cicero's home, ostensibly to pay him the salutatio or
ceremonial call.

It had been agreed that the consul should

be murdered as soon as they gained admittance to his room.
Their mission, however, was unsuccessful.

They arrived at

their destination but were refused admittance because Cicero,
10
who had been forewarned
of their coming through Fulvia,
had summoned to his aid several of

th~?.

chief citizens of Rome,

and had taken other measures to protect himself.

That he

was thoroughly alarmed, however, is evident from the fact
that he called a meeting of the Senate on the next day not
in the curia, but for greater protection, in the temple of
Jupiter Stator on the Palatine.

It was this occasion and

the unexpected presence of Catiline that called forth the
first of the four famous orations.
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The first of the Catiline orations is, in
brief, an expose of Catiline and his plan, and a command to
the rebel leaders to depart from the city.

~~en

Catiline,

attempting a defense was howled down, he rushed from the
11

place in a rage threatening to head the leaderless mob.
That night he fled the city, pretending he was going into
exile at Marseilles, but, in reality, he headed directly
for Faesulae and the camp of Manlius.

On the following day,

Cicero assembled the people in the forum and delivered the
Second of his orations against Catiline, explaining to the
people why Catiline had departed from the city, and begging
his accomplices either to desist from their revolutionary
attempts or to follow Catiline into exile.
Meanwhile at Rome the praetor, Publius
Cornelius Lentulus, who in the absence of Catiline had assumed leadership of the conspirators, ha.d gathered together
a force considered sufficient for their purposes.

It was

agreed that when Catiline had reached the camp of Manlius at
12
Faesulae, Lucius Bestia, a tribune of the plebs, should
assemble the people in the forum with the intention of attacking and denouncing Cicero.

This was to be the signal

for the others to carry out their various parts:

Statilius

and Gabinius with their followers were tofire the city at
twelve important points, and in the confusion that would in-
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evitably result, Cethegus was to make his way to Cicero and
slay him.
Cicero, though well aware of the schemes
that were afoot, had until this time been able to secure no
definite and decisive evidence against Catiline and lus
followers.

At this juncture, however, fortune played right

into his hands, placing in them the very evidence he needed.
There happened to be in the city at this time certain envoys
of the

Allobroge~,

a tribe in Transalpine Gaul, who had come

to Rome to complain about the behavior of their governor.
These envoys were approached by one Publius Umbrenus, an
agent of Lentulus, in the hope of inducing them to join the
13
conspiracy. In return for the redress of their grievances
and other substantial rewards, they were, on their return, to
induce their people to revolt and to dispatch a squadron of
cavalry to swell the growing forces of Catiline at Faesulae.
The envoys, at this point, entertained
certain doubts regarding the feasibility of the whole scheme.
In their perplexity they laid the matter before their patron,
Fabius Songa, who, in turn, relayed his information to Cicero.
Here was Cicero's opportunity, and he decided to make the
most of it.

Summoning the envoys to himself, he bade them

continue negotiations with the conspirators, instructing them
at the same time to obtain if possible written documents
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attesting the intentions of the followers of Catiline.
Lentulus, Cethegus and Statilius fell headlong into the trap.
oaths and pledges of faith were signed, sealed, and handed
to the envoys.

Among the documents was a letter from Lentulus

to Catiline urging the latter to enlist the aid of slaves.
By the evening of December 2 all their
arrangements were complete,

~~d

the Allobroges and their

escort, accompanied by Titus, Volturcius, one of the conspirators, stole silently out of the city.

As they crossed the

Mulvian bridge two miles north of Rome they were arrested by
the forces which Cicero had planted there for that purpose.
The Allobroges who were a party to the scheme quickly submitted, and Volturcius after a brief show of resistance quietly followed their example.

The letters were seized and speed-

ily delivered to Cicero who declined to open them buX instead
called an immediate meeting of the Senate in the temple of
Concord, summoning thither Bethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius.
He himself led in Lentulus by the hand.

Volturcius, on the

promise of a pardon, consented to reveal all he knew concerning the conspirators and their plans, and lus testimony was
confirmed by that of the Allobroges.
evidence lay in the letters.

But the most damaging

Each of the accused was con-

fronted with his seal and forced to acknowledge it before the
thread was cut.

The letters which urged the Gallic tribe to
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revolt were then read.
manifest to be mistaken.

The guilt of the accused was too
By a unanimous vote Lentulus was

requested to resign his praetorship, and then he and the
other conspirators were ordered to be taken into custody.
This was the occasion of Cicero's third oration against
catiline.
Meanwhile the freedmen and the dependents
of Lentulus were scouring the streets of the city endeavoring to rouse the artisans and the slaves to rescue him,
while Cethegus was sending messages to his followers to
gather arms and force their way to him.

On hearing these re-

ports Cicero again convoked the Senate to demand what he
should do with the prisoners.

Decimus Junius Silanus, the

consul-elect and therefore the first to speak, recommended
that they be put to death, but later, after the speech of
Caesar, he retracted this opinion in favor of the proposal
of Tiberius Nero who had merely advised that the guards be
increased and the question reopened.

Caesar, however, when

his turn came to speak, advised against departing from the
traditions and customs of their forefathers by putting Roman
citizens to deaht without the people's consent.

He proposed

instead that the accused be imprisoned for life in the various
14
municipal towns, and all their property confiscated.
His
speech evidently made a profound impression for Cicero felt
obliged to rise and deliver lris fourth and last oration
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against Catiline.
He told his listeners that as far as he was
concerned, the simpler proposition was that of Caesar, namely,
life-imprisonment, but he commended the proposal of Silenus
on the ground that traitors to their country had forfeited
their rights as citizens.

The majority of the Senate, how-

ever, were still in favor of Caesar's motion, when the stern
and unbending Cato rose to speak.

He assailed with charac-

teristic vigor all half-way measures, and demanded, a.s the
country's only salvation, the supreme penalty.

15

His motion

prevailed and that same day the prisoners were let down one
by one into the Tullianum, the ancient prison of the kings,
and strangled.

On his way home Cicero addressed the anxious

and curious people in what was probably the briefest speech
of his career: nvixeruntn, nthey have lived their life".
It was a march of triumph for Cicero.

Torchlights flared in

every doorway, and on all sides he was acclaimed the father
and preserver of his country.
The execution of Lentulus end his fellows
broke the backbone of the conspiracy.

A short time later in

a pitched battle at Pistoria, some twenty miles from Faesulae,
the remnants of Catilinets army were routed, but only at the
cost of a terrific slaughter on both sides.

Fighting val-

iantly in the van of his troops, and surrounded by the bodies
of his foes, Catiline breathed his last, and the second
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conspiracy was at an end.
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CHAPTER II
Political Gangs at Rome
Much that took place in the Rome of the first
century B. C., and, more particularly, much that concerns
the conspiracy of Catiline is inexplicable without some
appreciation of the part played in Rome by the political
gangs that harassed the last years of the dying republic.
For it would be a serious mistake to identify the mongrel
rabble that flocked after Catiline (Clodius, Milo and, Sestius
with the glorious "Populi Romani" whose virtues and achievements Cicero never tires of lauding.

Indeed, the man vv-ho had

1

inherited from Arpinum

his fierce patriotism and tender love

of Rome and his deep reverence and respect for her traditions
and past glories never did himself greater violence than
when he addressed this idel and corrupt mob with the proud
title of "Populi Romani". This must be understood, however,
not as a universal condemnation of the bulk of honest and
patriotic citizens living in Rome and outside it, but of that
noisy portion of the populace which though small in number
dominated the popular assemblies, exercising an influence
out of all proportion to their numbers.
It had been apparent, however, for some
time that the old Roman virtues were practiced not in Rome
but outside it in the provinces which had but recently gained
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the franchise.

Furthermore, the city mob, though it may have

included originally a small percentage of the honest and
upright citizens, had in the last few years changed radically
in character. It now included in its ranks large numbers of
.
2
foreigners ignorant of Rome and her patriotic and political
traditions.

For when Rome became the mistress of the world

she also became the melting-pot of the world, into which
flowed adventurers of every description till it could be said
of her in the time of the empire that ninety percent of the
resident population of Rome was of foreign extraction.

3

These strangers were, for the most part, slaves, but many of
them were freedmen who enjoyed the right to vote.

Their

numbers were increased by the crowds of farmers who flocked
to Rome at this time either because they had been Marian
sympathizers and had been dispossessed of their land to make
way for the veterans of Sulla, or because they were unable
any longer to compete with slave labor.

They preferred instead

to roam idle through the streets of Rome, whither they had
been lured by the promise of cheap food at the expense of the
state.

In later years the soldiers of Sulla finding the life

of colonial farmers uncongenial to their tastes drifted slowly
back to Rome.
It seems, however, that the greatest single
contributing factor to the social and economic distress of the

-

~-----------------------------------------------------------------,
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city was the slave population.

Though the number of slaves

at Rome can never be accurately determined, they seem beyond
all doubt to have formed a considerable part of the population.
pompey and Caesar alone are roughly estimated to have sent
4

over a million human beings under the yoke.

"long lines of

chained prisoners from Germany, Gaul, and even Britain", says
I)Uruy, "were led to Rome.

Utica and Egypt furnished blacks;

Numidia, swift runners; Alexandria, grammarians; Sidone and
cyprus, those intelligent, docile and corrupt Asiatics so
highly prized as house servants; Greece, her handsome boys
and girls; Epirus and Illyria, the most experienced shepherds;
Germany, Gaul and Thrace, the most savage gladiators; Cappadacia, the most patient laborers".
The result of this slavery was disastrous
for the moral and social as well as the economic life of the
city. · The thrifty and hardy Roman for all his contempt for
oriental pomp and ease, fell a willing victim before the
seductive and talented slave of the East, often his superior
in culture and learning.

Before long the slaves had gained

the ascendency in the greater part of the professions.

They

were the doctors and the teachers, the artists and the musicians, the tutors and the writers.

The gladiators formed a

class apart and it was but natural that men whose business it
was to kill-and be killed at the pleasure of a fickle mob
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should contribute much to the disorder and confusion of the
city.

It was, in fact, the custom to remove them from the

city in times of danger.
The greatest harm, however, wrought by the
slaves was that in Rome, as in all slave states, labor came
to bear the stigma of disgrace.

The ordinary citizen chose

to stand hungry and idle in the streets rather than work,
preferring to be fed, feasted, and entertained at the expense
of the state, even when work was available, which was not
often the case, for the cheap slave labor forced them from
their jobs into the ranks of the unemployed.

It was impossi-

ble to compete with slave labor especially when the slaves
were worked in gangs and hired out in groups by their ov.ners.
It was this last evil and its specific application to the
large scale plantation that emptied the rural districts into
Rome.

When the slave was no longer profitable he could be

conveniently granted his freedom, and cast off on the state.
Manumissions of this sort did much to swell the turbulent and
discontented elements of the city.
All these evils might have been present a.nd
yet have worked no appreciable difference in the political
life of the city were it not for one peculiar feature of
Roman politics---the lack of permanent party organizations
at Rome.

Voters followed a leader rather than a political
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principle.

5

The appeal of any particular candidate for office

lay not so much in any definite political platform as in his
own individual and personal qualifications.

Strictly speak-

ing, there were at Rome no rival political parties as we
know them today.

Though there were knights and nobles and

plebs and senators, yet it was not a contest between knight
and senator for the consulship.

The consulship, it was under-

stood, remained strictly within the charmed circle of the
senatorial order, and rarely in the long history of the republic was this tradition violated, notable exceptions were
Cicero and his fellow townsman Marius.

Since the individual

then played so important a role in Roman politics, it was
essential that he should gather around himself as many adherents as possible.

For this purpose he was accustomed

to equip himself with a large and handsome retinue.

A

favorable impression was thereby created and generally the
importance of the candidate and the strenght of his cause
could be gauged by the size of his escort.
There was, naturally, among office seekers
a fierce rivalry to gain the favor and votes of the mob,
who, as a rule, sold their votes to the highest bidder.
Conditions, indeed, had not changed much in tb.e time of
7
Juvenal, who termed the people's right of suffrage the
privilege of selling their votes.

It was when bribery and

~----------------------------------------------------·
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corruption and the gentler methods of persuasion had failed
that the political gangs demonstrated their unusual effectiveness.

Every sword in the candidate's retinue came to

signify so many more votes, since the peaceful elements in
the community could usually be induced to vote as their more
desperate fellows indicated.
Coincident with the change in. the character
of the Roman mob, there appears on the stage of Roman politics
a new character whom Rolfe terms the "political bossn.

8

He

divides the political boss into three types: the higher type,
of whom Marius, Sulla and Caesar are specimens; the lower
type who does not aspire to the higher offices, but who controls the votes and is able to "deliver the goods"; and,
"a middle type symbolized in Clodius and Milo, who attained
high office without rising to the lughest grades but who
pushed the fortunes of other men, or dragged down their
enemies".

It is to this lower and middle type that we have

reference when we speak of the political gangster.

It was

to be expected.that the urban rabble would fall under the
leadership of such men, who organized them into guilds and
political clubs called sodali tates or collegia sodalacia.•
These were, in fact, little more than escort gangs.

Origin-

ally, the collegia had comprised the various religious
brotherhoods and associations banded together in this manner
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for the celebration of some special cultus, but, gradually,
they had lost their sacred character, and, at this time,
they served merely as a pretext for arming the worst elements
in the city.

Any type of organization rendered them terribly

effective, particularly for purposes of bribery and coercion.
After the political gangs ·had been suppressed
10
it was Clodius who revived them.
Caesar on his ascent ot .
power in 47 B.

c.

supressed them again.

Though it was against

the law for a citizen to carry arms within the city, these
bands of swordsmen swept through the streets doing exactly as
they pleased since there was at Rome no regular police force
to see that the law was observed.

During the last days of the

republic they had no doubt become a permanent feature in
Roman politics, and, it may have been in the capacity of a
gang leader that Crassus and Caesar first made use of Catiline.
No one, however, seems to have organized them so effectively
and on so grand a scale as Clodius and Milo.

It was by the

aid of precisely such means that Clodius succeeded in forcing
through the laws that resulted in the exile of Cicero.
early as 62 B.

c.

As

when there was a bill before the assembly

to try Clodius in connection with his profanation of the rites
of the Bona Dea, Clodius surrounded the ballot boxes with his
armed ruffians, and succeeded in breaking up the meeting with11
out a vote.
The great Pompey, though he liked to consider

2-7
himself the first man in Rome, hardly dared at one time to
venture out of his house for fear of Clodius and his gangsters,
They were harassing him at the instigation probably of Crassus,
pompey's bitter rival.

It was only after Milo with his own

band of hired assassins had engaged Clodius in a prolonged
series of brawls and street fights that the assembly was able
to meet and pass the bill recalling Cicero.

The senate on

this occasion voted a sum of money to rebuild Cicero's house,
but Clodius and his gang drove off the workmen and burned
down the house of Cicero's brother next door.
After the departure of Crassus for the East,
a reconciliation was effected between Pompey and Clodius.
When Milo, therefore, ran for the consulship in 52 B. C1•
much against the will of Pompey, Clodius had an added motive
for attacking him.

Milo replied in kind by hiring several

rival gangs and the war was on.

Rome was the scene of one

riot after another, and street fighting became the order of
the day.

The elections, of course, were rendered impossible

so that this state of anarchy might have continued indefinitely had it not been for the memorable meeting between Clodius
and Milo on the Appian Way near Bovillae some ten miles from
Rome, when the swordsmen of Milo after an encounter in

V~:hich

they came off victorious, dragged the wounded Clodius from
a tavern into the road and murdered him.
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Pandemonium broke loose in Rome when it was
announced to the rabble that Clodius had been slain.

Tbey

besieged the senate house and heaping up the benches they
laid on this improvised pyre the body of their idol, burning
the senate house to the ground in their grief.

Meanwhile

the gangs of Clodius, on the pretext of looking for Milo
and his friends, were busy burning and pillaging.

At length,

to prevent further disorders, Pompey was recalled and made
sole consul, which was just what he desired.

Since there

was no one at Rome to hire them now, the gangs became superfluous; so Rome sat back to watch the struggle between Pompey
and Caesar who were playing for .much greater stakes this time
and with armies instead of gangs.
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CHAPTER III
Catilinets Guilt in the First Conspiracy
This thesis, it may be well to remark, is in
no sense of the word an apologia or defense of Catiline.

A

number of such defenses have been attempted, none with more
notable success probably than that of Professor E.

s.

Beesley,

which first appeared in the Fortnightly Review and has since
been reprinted.

Unfortunately most of Professor Beesley's

conclusions have since been discredited and his essay makes
interesting, if not altogether satisfactory, reading.

1

This

thesis is, however, an attempt to determine and estimate the
extent of Catilinets guilt, using as a basis of judgment the
the accounts of the conspiracy handed down by Cicero and Sallust.
Our efforts will be confined principally to
the texts of Sallust and Cicero because the "Bellum Catilinae"
of the former and the "Four Orations of Cicero against Catiline" are the chief sources from which our reliable information
of the conspiracy is drived.

The history of the Catilinarian

conspiracy as found in the subsequent authorities--Plutarch,
Appian, Suetonius, Dion Cassius, Florus and Paterculus--does
not differ essentially from the accounts of Sallust and Cicero.
Nothing, indeed, can be more certain than the fact that in
Rome in the year 63 B.C. there was a conspiracy, and that the

~------------------------------------------------------------~
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leader of this conspiracy was a notorious individual, by name,
Lucius Catilina.

The precise guilt of Catiline, however, and

the exact blame that attaches to him for his share in the plot,
is not quite so evident.

Cicero, of course, has tried to

immortalize him as public enemy no. 1 in the rogues gallery
of the Roman Republic.

On the one hand it may be that Cati-

line was not so black as he is generally painted; on the other
hand,_ perhaps, he was more so.

It is our purpose to find out

whether and to what degree Catiline may be acquitted or convicted of the charges brought against him.
We shall have gone far in our efforts to
determine the precise guilt of Catiline if we can assign him
his rightful role in the first conspiracy of 66 B.

c.

As is

evident, the crime of Catiline is rendered more heinous and
his guilt more obvious if we find that as early as 66 B.

c.,

three years before the major conspiracy, Catiline had already
led several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government.
On such a hypothesis the major conspiracy was not the result
of some sudden and desperate resolve, but the fruit of three
years of scheming and planning.

On the other hand, his guilt

is somewhat diminished if we find, instead, that the plot of
66 B.

c.

which supposedly comprised the two attempts on Janu-

ary 1, and February 5, was in all probability not repeated on
February 5, as Sallust claims and secondly, that Catiline was
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merely acting as the instrument of Crassus and Caesar, and
played, therefore, a rather minor role in the whole affair.
Both Cicero and Sallust give us very unsatisfactory accounts of this first conspiracy.

Sallust alone

of all the authorities makes any mention of a second attempt
on February 5.

If, as we intend to show, Crassus and Caesar

were the real leaders in this conspiracy, it quite contradicts
what we know of Caesar and his established policies and methods to say that he would risk a second failure so soon after
the first.

Moreover, if, as Mommsen claims, "from the passing

of the Gabinio-Manilian laws down to the return of Pompey
there was perpetual conspiracy in Rome",

2

it would seem only

reasonable to adopt the conclusion of Professor E. G. Hardy,
who had given us probably the finest treatment to date of this
vexing question, that it is well "in the complete absence of
all other mention of this second and more atrocious plot, to
dismiss it as irresponsible rumor carelessly repeated by
Sallust".

3

The most convincing piece of evidence, however,

that this second attempt never took place is the fact that
Cicero in his account of the first conspiracy, at a moment
when he is violently inveighing against Catiline and raking up
all sorts of charges against him both true and false, fails
to make even the slightest reference to this damaging bit of
information.

4
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The truth of the matter is that both Sallust
and Cicero are at evident pains to avoid all mention of erassus and Caesar in connection with the affair.

Sallust as an

avowed partisan of Caesar and the acknowledged recipient of
innumerable favors at his hands would naturally shrink from
introducing the name of his dead chief in so odious a venture.
Cicero for obvious reasons would not care to antagonize the
two greatest men in Rome at a time when his own position was
so precarious.

For the orations against Catiline

~'ere

written,

it must be recalled, some three years after the conspiracy
when the

first burst of enthusiasm had subsided and a popu-

lar reaction had set in against Cicero for his share in the
execution of Lentulus and his fellows.

Plutarch in his life

of Caesar tells us expressly that Cicero "voluntarily overlooked and neglected the evidence against him (Caesar) for
fear of bis friends and power for it was very evident to
everybody that if Caesar was to be accused with the conspirators, they were more likely to be saved with him, than he to
be punished with them".

5

Suetonius, however, had no such motives for
being reticent, and in no uncertain terms he tells us that
Caesar "venit in suspicionem conspirasse
consulari,

~

~

Marco Crasso

Publio Sulla et L. ftntonio post designatioem

consulatus ambitus condemnatis, ut principio anni senatum

r'
------------------------------------------------------------~

3-4

adorirentur, et trucidatis guos placitum esset, dictaturam
crassus invaderet, opse ab
constituague ad arbitrium
sulatus restitueretur".

6

~

~

magister eguitum diceretur
publica Sullae et Antonio QQg-

Unlike Sallust in his treatment of

this particular question, Suetonius immediately proceeds to
quote his authorities:

"Meminerunt hujus conjurationis

Lanusius Geminus in historia, Marcus Bibulus in edictis, c.
curio pater in orationibus", and he adds that Cicero too had
hinted as much in a letter to Axius.

7

A good deal of mystery still attaches to this
first conspiracy.

If the affair were as simple as Cicero and

Sallust would have us believe, why were the conspirators never
brought to trail, and why the seemingly tacit agreement on all
sides that the matter be dropped as quickly and as quietly
as possible?

VI'hen we conpare the account of Sallust with

what actually did transpire in Rome after the failure of the
conspiracy, we are faced vvith some very remarkable conclusions.
The story of the first conspiracy as told by Sallust is as
follows:
"Sed antea item conjuravere paucii contra rem publicam
in quis Catilina fuit; de qua verissime potero dicam.
L. Tullo et M. Lepido consulibus P. ftntonius et P. Sulla
designati consules legibus ambitus interrogati poenas
dederant •••••••••••••••• Erat eodem tempore Cn. Piso,
adulescens nobilis, summae audaciae, egens, factiosus,
quem ad purturbandam rem publicam inopia atque mali
mores stimulabant. Cum hoc Catilina et Antonius circiter nonas Decenbris consilio communicate parabant in
Capitolio kalendis Januariis L. Cottam et L. Torquatum
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consules interficere, ipsi fascibus correptis Pisonem
cum exercitu ad obtinendas duas Hispanias mittere".8
catiline and Antonius then were to kill the consuls Cotta
and Torquatus, and Piso was to be sent with an army into
Spain.

The attempt was a miserable fiasco.

But lo and be-

hold, a few months later we find Torquatus actually defending
catiline against a charge of repetundae

9

and Piso by a decree

of the Senate marching off to Spain with an army.

Cicero is

our witness for the first statement in his speech in behalf
of Sulla, another of the conspirators:
"Quin etiam parens tuus, Torquate, consul reo de pecunJ.J.s
repetundis Catilinae fuit advocatus, improbo homini et
supplici, fortasse audaci et aliquando amico. CUi cum
adfuit post delatam ad eum primam illam conjurationem,
indicavit se audisse aliquid non credidisse". 10
The second statement quoted above is testified by Sallust himself, who immediately after telling us
that it was part of the conspirators plan that Piso should
be sent to Spain with an army, has this to say: "Postea Piso
in citeriorem Hispaniam auaestor pro praetore missus est
adnitente Grasso, quod eum infestum inimicum en. Pompeio
cognoverat".ll

In that little sentence we have probably the

key to the whole first conspiracy.

From it we are able to

conclude to the moving spirits behind the whole affair,
Crassus and Caesar, for Sallust seems not to have understood
that he could not cast suspicion on Crassus without at the
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same time implicating Caesar.

12

Crassus and Caesar had joined

forces out of fear of Pompey who, it was expected, would
attempt to set up a military dictatorship on his return to
Rome from his brilliant campaigns in the East.
One move in the game of Crassus and Caesar
to checkFOmpey was to put in the consulship men like Catiline
and Antonius whom they could manipulate without too much
difficulty.

Another move was to send Piso, Pompey's deadly

enemy, to Spain with an army.
the conspiracy and though it

That was the original plan of
fai~ed

miserably, still Crassus

was powerful enough and wealthy enough to force the Senate to
send Piso to Spain after all, and not only that, but to endow him with praetorian powers as well.

This is confirmed

by Asconius in his commentary on Cicero's lost election speech

-"In

Toga Candida"

,

in which Cicero makes the following

statement: "Dico, P.

c.

super.iore nocte cu,1usdam hominis

nobilis et valde in hoc largitionis guaestu noti et cogniti
domum Catilinam et Antonium cum seguestribus suis convenissen •
.Asconius makes the following commentary:
"Aut c. Caesaris aut M. Crassi domum significat, ei
enim accerrimi ac potentissimi fuerunt Ciceronis refragatores, cum petiit consulatum, quod ejus in dies
civilem crescere dignitatem animadvertebant; et hoc
ipse Cicero in expositione conciliorum suorum significat. Sed ejus quoque conjurationis, quae Cotta et
Torquato coss. ante annum quam haec dicerentur facta
est a Catilina et Pisone, arguit M. Crassum auctorem
fuisse".l3
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sallust in lus attempt to clear Caesar's name of suspicion,
magnifies naturally Catilinets share in the proceedings.

He

is prompted by no such consideration with regard to Crassus:
"Fuere item ea tempestate aui crederent M. Licinium
Crassum non ignarum ejus ~Catilinae) consilii fuisse,
quia Cn. Pompeius invisus ipsi magnum exercitum dictabat, cujusvis opes voluisse contra illius potentiam
crescere, simul confisum, si conjuratio valuisset,
facile apud illos principem se fore."l4
Caesar's connection with the conspiracy was
equally notorious.

Caesar and Crassus

~vere

extremely anxious

at this time to get their hands on Egypt, the richest country
in the East, and in the advent of trouble with Pompey an
invaluable base of operations.

With men of the stamp of Cati-

line and Antonius in the consulship, their scheme stood some
chance of realization.

What other uses they would have made

of Catiline we can only conjecture.

We have a few indications,

however, in Titus Labienus who proposed the bill restoring the
election of the Chief Pontiff to the people instead of the
college of Pontiffs, and thereby secured the victory of Caesar
over his formidable rivals Catulus and Servilius.

.Another

tool of Caesar and Crassus, the tribune Servilius Rullus was
employed to introduce a measure which if carried would have
given them the power and the money and the armies they wanted.
It was the famed Agrarian Law for the distribution of land to
the poor, the money to purchase the land being raised by the
sale of government property in nine different provinces.

The

,
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law was to be administered by ten commissioners invested with
military power for a space of five years.

Caesar of course,

would head this commission, only the measure was defeated by
the efforts of Cicero.
These facts are important as showing where
the balance of power lay in Rome, and what the relations must
necessarily have been between Crassus and Caesar on the one
side and Catiline on the other.
tool.

Catiline was clearly the

It was with the evident intention of making some such

use of him that Caesar as president of the commission that
was trying those accused of performing the wholesale

execution~

for Sulla a.llowed the rest to be condemned, but the most
16

patently guilty of all, Catiline, to be acquitted.
however, was not deceived.

Rome,

Later when the second conspiracy

was at its height, Mommsen tells us that·nthe young men who
had taken up arms to ward off the incendiaries were exasperated against no one so much as against Caesar; on the fifth
of December when he left the Senate they pointed their swords
at his breast and he narrowly escaped with his life even now
on the same spot where the fatal blow fell on him seventeen
years afterwards; he did not again for a considerable time
17
enter the senate house."
At the trial of the conspirators
when Caesar had spoken against the death penalty and made
a profound impression on his listeners, Plutarch tells us
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that "the first man who spoke against Caesar's notion was
catulus Lutatius.

Cato followed and so vehemently urged in

his speech the strong suspicion about Caesar himself and so
filled the senate with anger and resolution that a decree was
18
passed for the execution of the conspirators."
The hand of Caesar, like that of Crassus,
was too manifest to be mistaken.

But at the same time the

influence of Caesar like that of Crassus was powerful enough
to discourage any proceedings that might be taken against him.
Crassus, it will be remembered, had been seriously implicated
by the testimony of Tarquinius.

Though many believed in the

guilt of Crassus still the testimony against him had been
stricken from the records and Tarquinius instead bundled off
19
to prison.
Even though Crassus was guilty, it was considered
a much wiser and safer policy to propitiate re.ther than exasperate him at such a crisis.

All tlus being true it rnigbt

well be questioned with what amount of fairness, considering
the relative parts played by Catiline and the powerful combination of Caesar and Crassus, the name of Catiline has come
to be attached to this "First Conspiracy of Catiline".

Clear-

ly he can have been no more than a minor and subordinate figure.

It is highly significant that Suetonius in his account

of the first conspiracy does not even mention the name of
20

Catiline.

r--------------------------------~
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CHAPTER IV
The Evidence in Cicero for Ce.tiline's Guilt
In the present chapter our efforts will
be mainly confined to a consideration of the evidence advanced by Cicero, for and against the guilt of Catiline, in
in his four famous orations.

There is question here of

Catiline's guilt with regard to the conspiracy i.e. precisely
how great or how little blame attaches to him as a conspirator.
This will however necessarily entail some discussion of the
further question of Catilinets private life and morals.

Littl

need be said in behalf of the case presented by Cicero against
Catiline.

We need only remark that so complete and masterful

was the task performed by Cicero that he has secured for
Catiline an immorte.li ty, which, questionable as it is, the
latter could never have achieved by his own efforts.

It is

an eloquent commentary on the skill of Cicero, end a wonderful
tribute to his genius that succeeding generations have hardly
dared to question the judgment he pronounced against Catiline.
Amid a welter of facts, and details and data incontestible,
Cicero has proved beyond all doubt that in the year 63 B.

c.

there was a movement afoot in Rome against the government,
a conspiracy, if you like, and that the leader of this movement was Catiline.

If one chooses to view Catiline solely

through the eyes of Cicero, the case is closed and Catiline
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·was just about the worst wretch that has ever graced this
earth.

But when Catiline is viewed through the eyes of a

ttdrd person, a.nd the implied statement weighed and balanced
against the explicit, the case against him is not quite so
obvious and terrible.

We see much at times in the very words

of Cicero that at a first glance might escape us.
at times certain details left unexplained.
we shall attempt to solve.

We find

Some of these

For our explanation we claim,

not that it is the only one or the commonly accepted one or
the best possible one but merely, that, given the circumstances, it is a reasonable one and a quite plausible one.

It

is in this frame of mind that we now look at the four orations
delivered by Cicero when the conspiracy was at its height.
The time of the composition a.nd deli very
of the four orations is of course extremely important.

Had

they been written some fifteen years or so after the crisis
had passed and the conspiracy was no longer a live issue,
we should expect to find even Cicero less violent in his
denunciations of Catiline.

As a matter of fact, the speeches

as we have them were not written till some three years after
the conspiracy when it was Cicero's avowed object to depict
Catiline in as lurid a light as possible.

A reaction had set

in against Cicero, as has been already mentioned, for the part
he had played in putting the conspirators to death.

These

speeches were, therefore, as much a defense of Cicerots own
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policy as an arraigment of Catiline.

It must be apparent

that Cicero's best defense lay in emphasizing and elaborating
the guilt of the conspirators.

This was, of course, particu-

larly true of Catiline not only as leader of the opposition
but as the symbol of that whole side of Roman life which
Cicero hated and condemned.

For these reasons we must be

somewhat cautious and critical in our interpretation of what
Cicero has to say of Catiline and attempt to estimate the
latter's guilt more by the content of what Cicero has to say
than the highly rhetorical manner in which he says it.
At the precise time the first oration against
catiline was delivered (Nov.s, 63 B. c. ) Cicero was striving
desperately to convince the authorities at Rome that this
conspiracy was to be taken seriously and that this Catiline
was in reality a dangerous character.

Thelast point most of

them would have been quite willing to concede.

Cicero faced

a much stiffer task, however, in the attempt to convince them
that Catiline was a serious menace to the safety of the city
as a whole.
fact.

His own words are a virtual admission of this

nouamguam n2E. nulli sunt in hoc ordine gui aut

~

ouae

imminent B2n videant aut ea guae vident dissimuent; gui spem
Catilinae mollibus sententiis
crescentem

~

~lluerunt

conjurationemque

credendo conroboraveruntn.

1

Earlier in the

same speech he had confessed as much when he declared:
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"Si te jam, Catilina, comprehendi, si interfici jussero,
credo, erit verendum mihi non potius hoc ornnes bbni
serius a me quam quisquam crudelius factum esse dicat.
Verum ego hoc quod non jam pridem factum esse oportuit
certa de causa nondum adducor ut faciam".2
The "certain reason " why Cicero did not dare to take any
definite steps against Catiline was the fact that these good
citizens either did not as yet take Catilinets attempt at a
revolution aeriously, or else they were not disinclined to
view with an indulgent eye a scheme that in any way appeared
to challenge Pompey.

In either case Catiline could not have

seemed to them the revolutionary abomination that Cicero
pretends; in fact, they were quite likely to welcome a movement

tr~t

promised resistance to Pompey.
It was only when the people realized that

the movement was directed against themselves that they took
any pains to suppress the conspiracy.

For already the several

classes in Rome had begun to regret the excessive powers they
had themselves placed in Pompey's hands by the passage of the
Manilian and Gabinian laws.

As Mommsen says: "never since

Rome stood had such powers been united in the hands of a singlE
3

man."

Pompey was now by reason of his victories over the

pirates and Mithradates virtual commander of the Roman forces
on land and sea.

Rome was consequently in a state of feverish

anxiety waiting to see what use the great soldier would make
of lus dictatorial powers when he grew tired of making and
unmaking monarchs in the East.

r
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The aristocratic oligarchy in Rome feared
Pompey as a threat to their supremacy and the popular party
with which Pompey was presumably allied realized that it now
had in Pompey an ally too powerful for its ovm good.

The

senate and the optimates were willing to go any lengths in
their toleration of Catiline if only they might thereby offset in some manner the advantages of Pompey.

This is clearly

shown by the fact that they sent the quaestor Gnaeus Piso
with an army to Spain with praetoria:n powers, simply because
of the deadly enmity that was known .to exist between himself
and Pompey, although Piso was a notorious intimate of Catiline
4
and had been implicated with him in the first cdnspiracy.
It must be apparent, then, that to convince
this audience which might be inclined to treat in somewhat
cavalier fashion the charges against Catiline, Cicero' was
forced to tax his resources to their utmost, and to leave
unsaid nothing that could be construed to Catilinets disadvantage.

This is no unfair reflection on Cicero, for in his

speech Pro Cluentio he himself expressly warns us against
accepting as historical facts the charges he might chance to
urge against anyone, guided as he was by the exigencies and
the circumstances of each particular case:
nsed errat vehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris,
quae in judiciis habuimus, auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. Omnes enim illae orationes causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum
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aut patronorum. nam si causae opsae pro se loqui
possent, nemo adhiberet orationem."5
That we have interpreted these words in
their true sense, we quote in proof Professor E. G. Sihler
who writes in this connection, "He ( Clu 139) positively
refeses within the sphere of his professional conduct or
procedure to be bound or constrained by any published utterance of the past.

An advocate cannot maintain genuine con-

sistency in dealing with the shifting and changeful cases
which he undertakes.

He is necessarily (Clu 139) determined
6

by the case in hand and by the circumstances attending it!!
Cicero himself, later on openly boasted that in this particular case he had thrown dust into the eyes of the jury.

A

distinction must be drawn between the genuine sincerity of
Cicero, the Roman patriot and the occasional special pleading
of Cicero, the Roman lawyer and rhetorician.

It is our task

to get behind the rhetoric and the invective and to let the
facts speak for themselves.
The first oration against Catiline is to a
large extent an impassioned appeal to Catiline to leave the
city.

This is the motif and it occurs time and time again

with singular insistence: "egredere aliqoamdo £X urbe, patent
Eortae, Erofisciscere ••••••• sin tu, quod te jamdudum hortor,
exieris •••••• exire

~

me num in exsilium?

urbe jubet consul host em.

nQg jubeo, sed si

~

interroga.s

consulis, suadeo •••

4-6

••••••• guam ob

~

discede atque hunc mihi timorem reipe •••••

••••••• quae~ ita sint, Catilina, dubitas, si emori aequo
animo !l2!2 potes, abire ••••••••• egredere

~

urbe, Catilina,"

and so on through the rest of the speech we find Cicero
begging, persuading and ultimately forcing Catiline to leave
7

the cit.
Why was Cicero so anxious that Catiline
depart safely from the city when he had already arraigned
him in sustained passages of invective as a desperado and
criminal whose freedom was a menace to the state?

Why was

Catiline not summarily arrested and thrown into prison or at
least incapacitated in some way frum wreaking further harm
on the state?

Certainly Cicero never dreamt for a moment

that his pleas to Catiline to abandon his ostensibly wicked
designs had made the slightest impression on him.

Nor do

the reasons Cicero gives for not seizing Catiline and putting
him to death seem entirely satisfactory.

Neither the "customs

of their ancestors" nor the "laws regarding the punishment of
Roman Citizensn would have caused Cicero any serious scruples
as he himself admits, for; npersaepe etiam privati in hac
8

ll publica perniciosus civis mote multarunt,"
gards punishing Roman citizens, why:

and as re-

"numguam in hac urbe

oui 3! .!:..§.publica defecerunt civium jura tenuerunt.n

9

He

did not hesitate a few weeks later to put Lentulus, Cethegus,

r
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Gabinius, Caeparius and Statilius to death without a formal
trial although they were Roman citizens and the law demanded
10
it.
The third reason Cicero gives, "the odium of posterity"
might well have been a consideration with him, but we can be
sure that Cicero in his recital of the events would take good
care that no odium should reflect upon himself.

We should

expect hardly less of a man whose supreme ambition lay not
in the amassing of wealth or in the exercising of authority
but in the winning of admiration.
lf,'e cannot help suspecting, however, that
Cicero's real reason for not apprehending Catiline was the
simple fact that Catiline had not as_yet committed any overt
act that would justify such behaviour on Cicerots part, or if
he had, that Cicero had not clear evidence of the fact.

This

would also explain the unexpected presence of Catiline in the
senate on this particular day for even Cicero does not appear
to ha.ve suspected him of such daring.

But Ca.tiline knew and

Cicero knew that as long as the former could keep up a bold
front in the city he was safe. If, however, Catiline could
be driven out of the city he had no other recourse but to go
to the camp of Manlius and once he did the conspiracy was a
fait accompli and Cicero had won.
much when he declared:

Cicero had hinted as ·

"Nunc intelligo, si iste, .0J:!2. intendit,

in Manliana castra pervenerit, neminem tam stultum fore qui

,

I

~-----------------------------------------------------------------,
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non videat conjurationem
11
aui
non
fateatur."
~ --- ~--~~~

~

factam, neminem tam imnrobum

It was, as a matter of fact, in just some
such manner that events actually transpired.

Catiline had

entered the senate and with the utmost coolness had taken
his customary seat in their midst, but gradually as Cicero
fired one denunciation after another at Catiliners head, those
sitting closest to him, fearing to draw Cicero's attention to
themselves, had quietly removed to a safe distance.

Sitting

alone in the crowded senate chamber, and listening to the
merciless invective directed against him by the greatest orator in Rome, Catiline had finally betrayed himself.

Rising

to his feet to answer Cicerors charges he had been howled
down, till at length mad with fury and raging under the insults heaped upon him by Cicero, he had rushed out of the
place shouting that: "since he was driven desperate by his
enemies, he would extinguish his fire by general devastation."
12

Cicero had forced lus hand and that night Catiline left

Rome for the camp of Manlius.

Cicero could now proceed again-

st Catiline as a declared enemy of the state, and since in
virtue of the extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the
senatus Consultum ultimum, his fielf of action was unlimited,
it is not hard to understand why Catiline lost no time in
fleeing the city.

It is, at any rate, the opinion of Pater-

culus that: "Catilina metu consularis imperii urbe pulsus
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est."
What conclusion are v;-e to draw?

Not that

Catiline was not a conspirator for a conspirator he certainly
was but merely this conclusion that if Cicero

h~~~d

to force

Catiline into open rebellion in order to convince the majority
of Rome to take the conspiracy seriously, then this is hardly
in accord with the traditional picture originated by Cicero
of a Catilinewith pallid face and bloodshot eyes who roamed
the streets of Rome breathing incendia scelera,
ricidia, latrocinia,etc.

This of course does not exculpate

Catiline from the charge of conspiracy.
his guilt.

caedes,~

It does not lessen

It merely gives us cause for pause.

Either

Catiline was a much more clever individual than we have been
led to believe and if he was, how explain his hesitancy, the
childish parade of-lictors, the melodramatic speeches, drinking of blood, etc.---or else he was not entirely the monster

that Cicero has painted him.

The point we are making is that

Cicero was designedly confusing two separate issues--he was
convincing his listeners of the heinousness of the conspiracy
with a recital of theheinousness of Catilinets private character.
We are of course dealing here only with
Catiline's guilt in connection with the conspiracy, and it
must be confessed that once he had proceeded to the camp of

r
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Manlius, there could be little doubt relative to that.
Regarding the charges leveled by Cicero against Catilinets
private life, i t would not be amiss to say something here
since our judgment of Catiline and the conspiracy has been
so largely influenced by the terrible stories of his private
life and while we have no reason to doubt their validity,
this however must be said.

Catiline lived in an age remark-

able in history for the utter abandon with which charges of
the most outrageous nature were freely bandied about.

Courts

for cases of slander and libel were unknown so one could
accuse his enemy of whatever crimes he chose and not fear the
consequences.

The only defense was to retaliate in kind,

with the result that neither side was believed nor even expected to be believed •

Such a state of affairs was the logi-

cal outgrowth of the legal training of the day.

The budding

orator or lawyer was taught to color his case, to render
heinous the most insignificant faults of his adversary and
even, i f need be, to slip in a few useful lies here and there.
The procedure was transfered with the greatest facility from
the school to the platform and the courtroom.

"On sait " says Bossj.er "oue les advocats de Rome
nthesit~ient gu~e A charges les gens qutils pour
suivaient de crimes imaginaires ••••••••• Ils ne prenaient m~me pas toujours la peine dtinventer un crime
nouveau, cree tout expres pour la circonstance et
approprie au personage; i l y en avait qui servaient
pour tout les occasions. Quand la caus~ se~blait un
peu maigre et ne fournissait pas assez a L'eloquence
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de ltavocat, il ne se faisait aucun scrupule d'y
joindre une bonne accusation dtassassinat. cr~tait
devenu une habitude, nous dit simplement Ciceron."l4
Cicero elsewhere refers to such proceedings as the law of
accusations, the lex accusatoris:

in another place he refers

to the mendaciuncula.
The accusations mentioned above received
the ready approbation of even the most prominent men.

Quintus

Cicero, in his treatise, De Petitione Consulatus, advises
his brother to:

"contrive if possible, to get some new

scandal started against your rivals (Catiline and Antonius)
for crime or immorality or corruption, according to their
character."

Professor T. Rice Holmes tells us that "this

last injunction Cicero diligently observed."

15

To us who

read the catalogue of Catilinarian crimes, Catiline appears
somewhat of a monster, but to the ordinary Roman who knew
how to subtract and divide what was said, he would in all
probability have appeared not much worse than his fellows.
Catiline could not have seemed to his contemporaries a wholly bad character for he enjoyed evidently
the acquaintance of some of the most outstanding
among them the noble and upright Quintus Catulus.

m~n

in Rome,

It was to

Catulus, as he was going to his doom, that Catiline entruste0
his wife Orestilla in the very last words that are known to
16

have come from his pen.

Cicero himself professes to have
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found some admirable traits in Catiline.
violent denunciations he hurled

ag~inst

In the midst of the
his rival Catiline in

the election speech, In Toga Candida, and the charges which
he later repeated in a still more aggravated form in the
Catilinarians, Cicero still found something to praise in his
17
adversary.
Five years later when the conspiracy was no
longer a live issue Cicero in lus speecn, Pro Caelio, makes
some references to Catiline that are even more surprising.
Defending Caelius against the charges of having-been too intimate with Catiline, Cicero uses these words with regard to
Catiline:
"Illa vero, judices, in illo homine mirabilia fuerunt,
comprehendere multos amicitia, tueri obsequio, cum
omnibus communicare, quod habebat, servire temporibus
suorum onmium pecunia, gratia labore corporis, scelere
etiam si opus esset, et audacia versare suam naturam et
regere ad tempus atque hue et illuc torquere ac flectere cum tristivus severe, cum remissis jucunde, cum
-senibus graviter, cum juventute comiter, cum facinerosis audacter,"l8
and a few lines further on:
"Me ipsum, me, inquam, quondam paene ille decepit, cum
et civis mihi bonus et optumi cujusque cupidus et firmus
amicus ac fideliter videretur; cujus ego facinora oculis
priusquam opinione, manibus ante quam suspicione deprehendi."l9
Cicero, in fact, seems to have been so completely deceived that he even contemplated defending Catiline
when he was being tried for malfeasance in office in order

r ---------------------------------------------------.
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that he might secure Catilinets aid in his quest for the consulship.
"Hoc tempre, Catilinam competitorem nostrum defendere
cogitamus; judices habemus quos voluimus, summa accusatoris voluntate. Spero, si absolutus erit, conjunctiorem illum nobis fore in ratione petitionis; sin aliter
acciderit, humaniter feremus."20
Thus in this letter to Atticus we find Cicero, in the first
kno'vn reference he makes to Catiline preparing if need be to
bear manfully the loss of Catilinets friendship.

Some have

even believed that Cicero actually did defend Catiline, notable Fenestella, but most authorities seem inclined to adopt
the position of Asconius, in his commentary on the In Toga
Candida:
"defensus est Catilina, ut Fenestella tradit, a M.
Cicerone quod ego ut addubitem haec ipsa Ciceronis
oratio facit, maxirne quod is nullam mentionem rei
habet, cum potuerit invidiam facere competitiori tam
turpiter adv'3rsus se coeunti. 11 21
It seems evident at any rate that even Cicero had not always
regarded Catiline as the traditional bete noire of Rome.
The third and fourth Catilinarian in as far
as they directly affect Catiline add little to the condemnation that Cicero ha0 already pronounced against him in the
first and second orations.

The third orati(Jn delivered be-

fore the people on December 3 is largely a narration of how
Cicero with the aid of the Allobroges had trapped the leaders
of the conspiracy in Rome.

The fourth is concernedwLth the
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punishment that is to be inflicted on them.

We, therefore,

turn, our attention to the second oration delivered before
the people on November 9.

It is for the most part an ar-

raignment of Catiline and his associates and contains the
famous catalogue of Catilinets accomplices.

It was Cicero's

object to throw discredit on Catiline and his movement by
holding up to ridicule the elements on which it rested, and
in this he had succeeded.

It is interesting to note however,

that all six classes mentioned by Cicero have some connection,
either proximate or remote, with the universal evil of the
day--debt.

Knights, senators, gamblers, bankrupts, spend-

thrigts, paupers, idlers, soldiers,--they ha1 but one thing
in common, the misery and the anxiety of the debtor.

It was

the promise of the Novae Tabulae and repudiation of debts
that drew them round the standard of Catiline.

They were

a class whose allegiance was valuable neither to the optimates
nor the popular party.

This would explain why they fared

badly at the hands of the two traditional parties and their
leaders, but would not on that account make this third party
a necessarily disreputable one, except in the eyes of its
enemies.

The above classification of Catiline's followers,

it must be remembered, is Cicero's.

Any disrepute lay not

in the fact that they ';,ere debtors bm that they were small
debtors.

There was scarcely an eminent man of the day again-
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st whom this charge could not be leveled, including Cicero's
own followers.

According to the severe regulations of the

times regarding mortgages, if a debtor was unable to meet his
obligations punctue.lly, even if it were only the interest on
his debt, the creditor was entitled to take possession of the
22

mortgaged property.

One can readily imagine the countless

number of debtors such a measure would breed even amongst the
wealthy senatoris.l class who were no longer capable of raising the huge sums necessary for the maintenance of their
hereditary estates.
ous.

The case of Caesar is of course notori-

Even if we ·discount the figure quoted by PlutBrch, 1300

talents, his debts must have been prodigious--and this before
he had held any public office.

The imputation of debt there-

fore was not sometlung peculiar to the party of Catiline

alon~

Ca tiline, in fa.ct, was extremely sollici tous about the good
name of his enterprise.

Throughout the v.'hole course of the

conspir!;l-CY his actions tend to show "that desperate though
his plight might be, he felt that he had a respectable cause·
and was determined to keep it so.n

23

One of the most significant acts of Catiline
in this direction was his refusal to enlist the aid of slaves.
It has been remarked already how numerous these slaves were
in Rome and what a. constantly disturbing factor they proved
in the maintenance of order within the city.

It can be seen
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at a glance what a welcome contribution they v,·ould have ma.de
to the slender forces Catiline had at his disposal.

Only a

few years previous these slaves had risen under Sparts.cus and
had succeeded for a time in terrigying the whole Italian
peninsula while holding at bay the armies of several Roman
magistrates.

They only fell before the superior might of
24

Crassus and Pompey.
To the very end Catiline was adamant in his
refusal to enroll slaves, despite the entreaties of the other
leaders at Rome, particularly Lentulus.
copy of the letter which Lentulus sent

The following is a
Catili~e,

only to have

it intercepted by Cicero:
TTQuis sim ex eo quem ad te misi cognosces. Fac cogites
in quanta calamitate sis, et memineris te virum esse
consideres quae tuae rationes postulent. -~.uxili urn petas
ab omnibus, etiam ab infimis,n
and adds Sallust:
TTAd hoc mandata verbis dat; cum ab senatu hostis judicatus sit, quo consilio servitia repudiet.n25
Still later when Catiline was being besieged by the army
of Antonius and was in sore need of recruits, he still refused the a.id of the slaves vvho flocked to him in large numbers.

Sallust says:

nrnterea servitia repudiabat, cujus initio ad eum rnagnae
copiae concurrebant, opibus conjurationis fretus, simul
alienum suis rationibus existimans videri causam ci.vium
cum servis fugitivis communicavisse.H26
That Catiline evidently considered his cause
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an honorable one we may conclude from Cicero's own words in
the second oration where he tells us that Catiline had sent
in

advance to the camp of Manlius, among other things; nfas-

cis, tubas, signa militaria, aquilam illam argenteam."
no sane man at an extreme crisis of

~~s

Now

life--least of all a

man like Catiline--is going to burden himself with a lot of
ceremonial clap trap and appendages unless he had some serious
purpose in view.

It was evidently CatilineTs intention by the

use of these traditional insignia of authority to impress upon
his followers as well as upon the rest of Italy the honesty
and legitimacy of the cause he had undertaken.

For the fas-

ces were originally the emblem of the kings absolute authority
over life and limb, and as such had passed over to the Roman
magistrates as the symbol of soverign power.

The aquila ar-

gentea referred to v.as the insignia of Marius, the great popular hero and was intended to earn for Catiline the sympathy
and support of the common people.

It was also designed to

gain the assistance of the rural provinces, on which Catiline
was counting heavily for men and arms, for it was through the
efforts of Marius and the tribune Sulpicius Rufus that the
Italian allies had been enrolled among the tribes

•

~n

_,orne.

'R

All this tended to cloak the designs of Catiline in respectability.

To say that Catiline believed his cause a good one

is fa.r from claiming that the cause he espoused was objective-

r.-------------------------------~
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ly a good one.

We have no evidence, not even from the pen of

Cicero, that Catiline did not sincerely believe in the cause
for which he was prepared to risk everything.

His actions on

this point at least, are surprisingly consistent.

True, the

instruments he used were anything but respectable but Cat.iline
was a desperate man and he had recourse to such methods only
when he· saw that the legitimate approa.ches to his design were
closed to him.

He had seen himself worsted time after time

by the equestrian monied interests and the influence they
could buy.

For we must remember that Catiline was defeated

in his quest for the consulship by only. a few votes that
had been marshalled against lurn by the equestrians and their
friends.

If Catiline is accused of importing voters into the

city, the same is true of his enemies in a greater degree.
On that day many nobles and knights "who had never appeared
in the Campus Martius in their lives came with set and anxious
faces to the voting booths followed by a procession of friends
and clients.

The voting was very close

had overcome numbers."

b~tonce

more money

27

Cicero, moreover, was subseauently proven
wrong in the slurs he cast on the morale of Catilinets associates and their loyalty to him.

Cicero referring to them

had ostentatiously declared: "quibus ego !12!1 modo si aciem
exercitus nostri, verum etiam si edictum praetoris ostendero,
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concident.n

28

Cicero's grim little joke was not without its

point f'or in his edict the praetor was accustomed to lay down
the laws he would observe in arranging the proceedings of the
regular courts for the coming year and in deciding cases not
covered by the twelve tables.

Cicero thought that a joking

reference to its contents might be enough to discourage the
more timorous of Catiline's followers.

He was wrong however

for they did fall eventually at the battle of Pistoria but
not at the praetor's edict.

They wrote, in fact, the noblest

chapter in Catilinets life, for says Sallust:
"confecto proelio tum vero cerneres quanta audacia
quantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinae.
nam fere quem quisque vivos pugnando locum ceperat,
eum amissa anima corpore tegebat ••••••••• postremo ex
omni copia neque in proelio neque in fuga quisquam
civis ingenuus captus est; ita cuncti suae hostiumque
vitae juxta perpercerant.n29
Ev'en before this time, when the senate had
pronounced Catiline and Manlius traitors and had voted that
an army should be levied immediately to pursue Catiline, we
learn from Sallust:

"~

tanta multitudine negue praemio

inductus conjurationem patefacerat neque
quisauam omnium discesserat. n

30

~

castris· Catilinae

It might rea.dily be constru-

ed then as sometlung of a tribute to the character of Catiline
as well as his associates that despite the fact that t.hey
were one and all heavily in debt, not one came forv.rard to
testify against Catiline and claim the promised rewards.

For
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the senate had voted various rewards at this time to anyone
volunteering information about the plot, to a slave, his
freedom and a hundred thousand sesterces, and to a free man,
with immunity from complicity, two hundred thousand sesterces.
31

The awards, however, went unclaimed.

This is a_ rather

remarkable circumstance if as Cicero tells us, Catiline was
so universal an object of hate and his associates so utterly
abandoned.

It is a fact that might have gone unmentioned.

It does not make Catiline any less a conspirator but it does
help toward giving us a fairer less distorted and therefore
truer picture of that conspirator.
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CHAPTER V
The Evidence For Catilinets Guilt in Sallust.
As with Cicero, so with Sallust an analysis
must be made of the historian's attitude towards Catiline if
we are to form a true judgment of Catilinets guilt.

In this

way we shall consider not only vvhat is said by Sallust about
Catiline, but, by reading between the lines, much of what is
often left unsaid.

For Sallust in the Bellum Catilinae has

sketched for us a picture of Catiline blacker if anything
than that painted by Cicero.

Yet a closer scrutiny of his

picture reveals just enough light touches here and there to
leave us with the unmistakable impression that Catiline was
after all not entirely base, and that the wicked and perverse qualities in his character were not unaccompanied by
some admirable and redeeming traits that affect his character
both as a comspirator and a private citizen.

Sallust's

portrait of Catiline, however, as has been remarked, is far
from flattering.

He repeats in substance the same charges

against Catiline that Cicero had made years before.

He

mentions, for example, Catilinets passion for Aurelia Orestilla at whose bidding Catiline was supposed to have murdered his own stepson, but with this qualification, "so it
is generally believed."

In another place repeating Cicero's

accusation against Catiline of personally corrupting the
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young men of the city, Sallust nullifies the whole charge
when he admits that the report had become current not through
any real evidence

11

sed

~

aliis rebus, magis guam guod cui2

guam id compertum foret, haec fama valebat."

In other words,

this charge also was the result not of any real proof, but
still another ncreditur."

It appears as such and no more

even to Sallust.
Our concern, however, is not so much with
theguilt of Catilinets private life as with his guilt in connection with the conspiracy.

In one paragraph Sallust gives

us a complete summary of the v;hole affair:
"Eis amicis sociisque confisus, Catilina simul quod
aes alienum per omnis terras ingens erat et quod plerique Sullanii milites largius suo usi rapinarum et victoriae veteris memores civile bellum exoptabant, opprimendae rei publicae consilium cepit. In Italia nullus
exercitus, en. Pompeius in extremis terris bellum gerebat; ipsi consulatum petenti magna spes; senatus nihil s
sane intentus; tutae tranquillaeque res omnes sed ea
prosus opportuna Catilinae.n3
There in brief we have the history of the origin of the
conspiracy as Sallust sees it.

But that immediately raises

the question, how did Sallust see it?
throughout towards catiline?

What is his attitude

vre know Cicero's motives for

writing against Catiline; what were Sallust's?

To answer

these questions at all satisfactorily we must consider briefly
some few events of Sallust ts life.
Gaius Sallustius Crispus (86 B.C.-34B.C.)
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had received as a youth a rather good education and so was
enabled at an early age to enter upon a political career at
Rome.

In 52 B.C. he was elected tribune of the comn1ons; two

years later, ho·wever, he was expelled from the senate by the
censor Appius Claudius Pulcher.

The following year Caesar

reappointed him to the quaestorship, and Sallust became
once more a member of the senate.
of life had begun forhim.

A new and significant phase

In the year 48 B.C. he was appoint-

ed commander of one of Caesar's legions in Illyricurn but was
defeated by Octavius and Libo.
equally disasterous.

His next appointment was

He was sent to Campania to quell a

mutiny among the troops but was lucky to escape with hislife.
At last in 46 he succeeded in distinguishing himself, by
sailing to the island of Circina and seizing the enemy's
stores.

He was rewarded by Caesar with the appointment of

the proconsular governorship of the province of Illyria and
Africa.

On his return to Rome he was tried for extortion

"but was acquitted doubtless through Caesar's influence.n

4

It is maintained, but on doubtful authority, that he even
gave Caesar a bribe of two million sesterces.

He was, at

any rate, immensely wealthy and could afford to retire from
political life to the magnificent gardens that bore his name
and were afterwards the personal property of the emperors.
It is not at all difficult to understand
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why Sallust should have revered the name of Caesar.

Nor is

it difficult to understand why, when Caesar was assassinated
and Sallust was seeking a theme for his ·pen, he should have
chosen this means of repaying his dead benefactor.
of glorifying Caesar was to clear his

na~e

One way

of the charges that

had linked him with the conspiracy of Catiline.

One sure

way of distracting attention from Caesar's name in this connection was to magnify and enhance the part played by Catiline
Whether Sallust really undertook the Bellum Catilinae with
this intention is of course a mooted question.
ties are inclined to believe he did.

Many authori-

Mommsen for one is

quite emphatic in his affirmation of the fact: nsuch an apology is the ncatiline" of Sallust, which was published by the
author a notorious Caesarian after the year 708 (46 B.C.)
either under the monarchy of Caesar or under the triumvirate
of his heirs evidently as a treatise with a political drift,
which endeavors to bring into credit the democratic party--on
which in fact the Roman monarchy >:vas based--and to clear
Caesar's memory from the blackest stain that rested on it;
and with the collateral object of whitewashing as far as
possible the uncle of the triumvir Marcus Antonius ••••••••••
The circumstance that the adroit author keeps the

~pologetic

and inculpatory character of these writings of his in the
background, proves, not that they are not partisan treatises,
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but that they are good ones."

Despite the sympathies, then,

that Sallust, as an avowed opponent of the oligarchs, might
feel for Catiline, he would of necessity be forced to treat
him rather severely if he were to achieve his purpose of
clearing Caesar's name.
We must not, however, be unfair to Sallust
and it is only reasonable to credit him with the moti ''e he
himself tells us he had in mind in choosing this particular
theme: "Igitur de Catilinae conjuratione quam verissime
potero paucis absolvam; nam id facinus in primis ego
memorabile existimo sceleris atque periculi novitate."
He had just stated previously: "statui

~

gestas populi

Romani Carptim, ut quaeque memoria digna videbantur, pre7
scribere." This may well have been Sallust's chief reason
for picking a.s his theme the conspiracy of Catiline for as
Boissier poinfs out, among its other attractive features,
Sallust ha.d been a personal witness of much that .he.d transpired, had received the confidences of Crassus and was on familiar terms with Caesar.

But roost important of all:

"Mais· ~ qui lui convenait surtout dans ce sujet,
ctest qutil etait dramatique, qu'il mettait aux prises
des personages importants, qu'il lui donnait l'occasion de tracer leur portrait, de les faire agir et
parler de peindre les moeurs du temps, toutes 6hoses
dans lesquelles il excellait et dont le public etait
alors tres friand."8
Assuredly all these considerations.would have weighed heavily
with a man like Sallust, making as he was a bid late in life
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for fame as a writer.
But the motive here assigned and the one
previously offered--his anxiety to clear Caesar's name--are
by no means irreconciable.

Sallust could take this theme

as it was delighting in the opportunities it afforded his
peculiar genius and still manipulate his materials in such
a manner that Caesar would come through the ordeal unscathed.
The only one who might suffer in the process was Catiline and
that scarcely mattered since he was so notoriously guilty
already.

It would, moreover, heighten the dramatic tone of

the work to enlarge the part of Catiline and intensify his
guilt.

We know for a fact that it was some such motive that

led Sallust deliberately to antedate the conspiracy a full
9

year.

If Catiline could be shown to have plotted against the

state on his own initiative for over a complete year, there
could be no earthly reason for dragging in the name of Caesar,
and Sallustts purpose would have been achieved.
No true estimate of Catiline, however, can
ever be formulated unless we understand the motive that induced him to take up arms against the government.

Despite

the fact that it is on precisely this point that the whole
justification of the conspiracy stands or falls, it is a.
question that has received but scant treatment.

That Cati-

line had some good reason for rebelling, we cannot doubt.
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No man in his right mind ever took up arms against his ovm
country out of sheer perversity.

ft~d

we have the best of

evidence that Catiline was not a madman.

On the contrary,

i t has been declared "that a re-examination of the evidence

from an unprejudiced point of view shows that there is a
remarkable consistancy in Catiline's various remarks concerning his program.

On no important plank of his platform

does he contradict himself, nor does any action of the conspirators waver in purpose.

They all knew v'hat they were

about and they had a real program in which i t can be shown
10
by Ciceronian evidence they honestly believed. n
·what this
program was it is our intention to discover.
In a quotation from Sallust previously cited
we saw that the reason there assigned for Catilinets plan
to overthrow the government wasthe fact that his own debt
was enormous: naes alienum per omnes terras ingens erat";
and, secondly, that the veterans of Sulla were eager for
war: "Sullanii milites ••••• civile bellum exoptabant."
this cannot be the whole story.

Clearly

No man ever induced his

fellowmen to join his conspiracy because he was heavily in
debt and because thez were of a generally revolutionary character.

As a matter of fact, this is refuted by the letter

of Catiline to Catulus.
no reason to doubt.

That the letter was genuine we bBve

It is evident that Sallust believed it
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was genuine from the way he accepts it with the simple comment: "earum exemplum infra scriptum est."

In this letter

which throughout breathes a tone of sincerity that is notably
wanting in his other letters, Catiline explains to Catulus
that he had undertaken this revoltion not because he was unable to pay off his own personal debts: "n2!!. c;uia aes a:lienum
meis nominibus ,g possessionibus solvere n£!! Possem (et alienis nominibus liberalitas Orestillae suis fili egue copiis

-

11

persolveret)n.

AnY other obligations could be met from the

estates of Orestilla anQ her daughter.

Catiline had, it is

true, squandered enormous sums in his various trials and campaigns for office but it is not unlikely that he had still
some little left from his lucrative years as provincial governor in Africa.

If worst came to worst there was always

Crassus to fall back on.
Crassus had already tried Catiline's services in the first conspiracy.
many lengths to retain them.
political career of Caesar.

He would be willing to go
He was at present financing the

In his struggle with Pompey,

however, he could probably get more advanta.ge out of Ca. tiline
than he could out of the less tractable Caesar.

We know, for

a fact, that he was willing to go much further in his championship of Catiline.

According to the account of Sallust it

was even believed that Cicero had instigated Tarquinus to
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testify against Crassus in connection with the conspiracy in
order to prevent Crassus from taking up their cause: "Alii
Tarquinium 2: Cicerone immissum aiebant,
suscepto malorum patrocinio

~

~

Crassus more suo

publicam conturbaret".

P~d,

adds Sallust, as if to remove the last shred of doubt on

tr~s

score: "Ipsum Crassum ego postea praedicantem audivi tantam
12
illam contumeliam sibi ab Cicerone impositamn.
There was
unmistakeably belund the whole conspiracy something more than
the mere fact of Catilinets indebtedness.

It was more than

the case of a lone individual seeking redress from society
at large for his ovm personal grievances.
It would, however, be true to say that it w
was this question of debt if anything that lay back of the
whole conspiracy.

That it was the whole problem of debt that

was responsible for the outbreak and not any personal embarassment on the part of Catiline himself can be proven
from·cicerots own words in his letters where he makes reference to the conspiracy in terms of money and debt alone and
does not so much as mention the name of Catiline:
nitaque me nunc scito tantum habere aeris alieni, ut
cupiam conjurare, si quisqua~ recipiat, sed partim
odio inducti me excludunt et aperte vindicem conjurationis oderunt, partim non credunt et a me insidias
metuunt nee putant se nummos deesse posse qui ex
obsidione faenatores exemerit".l3
Three years later writing t

his brother Quintus in a more

serious vein, he remarks not that his consulship has saved
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the country but that it had saved the fortunes of the wealthy:
"oui aut quod publicani sunt,

~

summa necessitudine attin-

gunt, aut,guod ita negotiantur ut locupletes sint, nostri
consulatus beneficio se incolimus fortunas habere arbitran14
tur."
That Cicero knew well enough what lay behind
the conspirators' action can be shown from "his cruel joke
about frightening the conspirators with the urban praetor's
15
edict."
The edictum here referred to was the mandate of the
civil authority imprisoning the debtor in default of payment
and confiscating his personal possessions.

Whether this was

an absolute right to the debtor's person or merely a limitation of his liberty until the debt was paid, is a question
that can have made little practical difference.

It was in

either case equally disastrous for the poorer classes.

It

was as a champion of these oppresses people that Catiline
designed to appear.

He says: npublicam miserorum causam pro
16
~~ether he spoke the truth or
mea consuetudine suscepi."
not we have no means of knowing, save that these words were
written in the face of an approaching doom to

r~s

friend 0.

Catulus, by far the noblest of Catiline's acquaintances and,
indeed, one of the most upright men in all Rome.

Catiline

could scarcely have hoped to deceive Catulus at this point.
To the very end Catiline never wavered in
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the declaration of his purpose.

In his address to his troops

before going into battle he still places the causes of the
whole revolt on the bases of debt and its oppressions:
npraeterea, milites, non eadem nobis et illis necessitude impendet; nos pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita
certamus, illis supervacuaneum est pro potentia paucorum pugnare ••••• licuit vobis cum summa turpitudine in
exsilio aetatem agere, potuistis non nulli Bomae amissis bonis alienas opes expectare; quia illa foeda atque
intoleranda viris videbantur, haec sequi decrevistis."l7
Long before this in the memorable meeting
at Laecats house Catiline had fired the minds of the conspirators by contrasting the poverty and debt in which they lived
with the luxury and splendor of their oppressors:
"Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium atoue
dicionem concessit, semper illis reges, tetrarachae
vectigales esse, populi, nationes stipendia pendere;
ceteri omnes boni mali nobiles atque ignobiles volgus
fuimus sine gratia , sine auctoritate eis obnoxii,
quibus si res publica valeret formiriine essemus. Ita~ue omnis gratia, potentia, honos divitiae apud illos
sunt aut ubi illi volunt; nobis reliquere pericula
repulsas judicia egestatem", and further on: "cum
tabulas signa toreumata emunt, nova diruunt alia aedificant postremo omnibus modis pecuniam trahunt, vexant,
tamen summa lubidine divitias suas vincere nequeunt.
At nobis est domi inopia foris aes alienum mala res
spes multo asperior denique quid reli']ui habemus praeter
miser am anima.m. "18
·
A still more convincing argument,.however,
that it was the oppressive measures enacted against the debtor
class that induced the conspirators to revolt was the message
sent by Manlius to Marcius Rex.

This sincere and straight-

forward appeal from one soldier to another is the most reveal-
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ing document of all.

Says Manlius:

"Deos hominesque testamur, imperator nos arma neque contra patriam cepisse neque C!UO periculum ali is facer emus,
sed uti corpora nostra ab injuria tuta. forent qui miseri egentes violentia atque crudelitate faenetatorum
plerique patriae sed omnes fama atque fortunis expertes
sumus. Neque cuiquam nostrum licuit rnore maiorum lege
uti neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere; tanta
saevitia faeneratorum atque praetoris fuit."l9
Cicero's joke about the "praetor's edict" was after all not
quite so harmless.
It is in this same message that

~ve

finally

strike upon what is probably the best explanation of the true
genius cmd character of the conspiracy.

~i1anlius

in ju.stifica-

tion for his taking up arms against the government appeals to
the traditions and customs of their forefathers, who several
times took up arms and seceded from the limits of the city
when aroused by the arroga.nce of the magistrates.
"Saepe maiores nostrum miseriti plebis Romanae decretis
suis inopiae ejus opitulati sunt, ac novissime memoria
nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni volentibus
omnibus bonis argentum aere solutum est. Saepe ipsa
plebes aut dominandi studio permota aut superbia magistratuum armata a partibus secessit."20
·Manlius appeals to the traditions of their forefa.thers on
two counts, first, because of the great debt they had pa.ssed
a decree whereby silver was paid in copper, end, secondly,
they had taken up arms and vithdrawn from the city when their
rights were not respected.

He i'.-as referring to the

seces~don

of the plebians who threatened to withdraw from the city and
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form an independent community unless the patricians granted .
them certain rights.

Three such secessions are recorded, the

first to the Mons Sacer in 49 B.C. the second to the Aventine
in 449 B.C. and the third to the Janiculum in 28'7 B.

c.

The

fourth was to have been that of Catiline in 63 B.C.
If this was Catiline's inteDtion in the beginning we can readily see v.·hy the whole affair ended as it
did in armed rebellion foredommed to fa.ilure before the superior armies of the state.

In a state not yet perfectly formed

it had some chance of success, but in the highly organized
and efficient Rome of Cicero's day it had none whatever.
men of

tl~

To

genius of Cicero, Pompey, Crassus and Caesar it

was but child's play to show up such a movement as an atter:,pt
at treason, and crush it.
Cicero actually did.
in our

OVI~

country.

This is,

a~;

we have seen, 'Nhat

A not unlikely pa.rallel is: to be found
In the American Revolution the colonies

were successful in their attempt to withdraw their allegiance
from England.

Had Carolina ci1osen to secede from the Union

in those early subsequent years the attempt would probably
have been successful.
late.

When she did make her bid she was too

The forces alligned against her had been solidly mass-

ing all those years.

So with Catiline.

The forces against

which he dashed himself were too firmly established.

And

fortunately so, for a victory for Catiline was by no means a
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desirable thing.

Some passing good he might have done but in

the end he would have brought no lasting benefit to Rome.
He would at any rate have fallen before the superior :might
of either Pompey, Crassus or Caesar.
We have now reached a stage in our investigation of Catiline's guilt when we can call a halt and summarize some of our conclusions.

Enough of the evidence for

and against Catiline has been sifted to enable us to pass
some sort of judgment.
state.

Catiline did indeed plot against the

The evidence for this fact, if

of Cicero and Sallust, is overwhelming.
line categorically as the

great~st

"~Ne

accept the evidence
But to condemn Cati-

rogue in ancient times--

the ordinary procedure in our textbooks--is to stray in another direction equally as far from the truth.

It may be the

acceptable practice to paint Catiline in black for the sake of
impressing the youthful student but it i!3 bad history and as
long as there is question of truth then at least let us ernploy some shade of gray.

The cause of Catiline, it must be

remembered has never had a pleader before the tribunal of
history.

We have seen how evilly he fared at the hands of

Cicero.

That Sallust treated him no better is perhaps the

surest proof that Catiline had broken with Caesar and the
popular party.

For this reason rd.s cause has never been heard

nfor all the authors of our historical sources were allied to
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some degree with one party or the other, and naturally did
not have a good word to say about Catiline or a program like
his.

Catiline's own party, on the other hand, being composed

largely of the poorer classes and a few members of the upper
classes who were either executed or silenced was completely
21
inarticulate."
The ·world has never heard any version of
Catilinets story but the one which flows from the lips of his
enemies.
One of the first conclusions VJe reached
regarding Catiline was that his name has come to be falsely
attached to the first conspiracy.

His part in this affair

was entirely subordinated to those played by Caesar and erassus.

His guilt, therefore , in this connection has been

unjustly and unfairly magnified.

Plutarch in his life of
22
Cicero sins especially in this regard.
This first conspiracy

v~as

a simple bid for power by Crassus and Caesar and

though Catiline does seem to have some share in the proceedings he does not deserve the obloquy that would attach to
him had he actually been planning an organized attack on the
government through three continuous years.
The next conclusion we reached was that we
had to be extremely cautious in accepting wholly without
question Cicero's testimony against Catiline.
clearly in this case a special pleader.

Cicero was

In the language of
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today "he was out to get Catiline."

The speeches were

written in the midst of a wave of intense popular reaction
against Cicero for his unorthodox execution of the conspirators when it was to Cicerots evident advantage to paint in
as lurid as light as possible Catilinets personal character.
For the same reason it was necessary that the dangerous elements in the conspiracy should be highly colored and ·exaggerated.

One of the conclusions we reached here was that Cicero

cleverly manouvered Catiline into a postion 1"1here the latter
was forced to betray himself and leave the city.

No matter

what the designs of Catiline may have been until then, it
was now a simple task for Cicero to construe them into a
treasonous attempt on the state.

Catiline could then be treat

ed as an avowed public enemy and an army dispatched against
him.

Another conclusion we drew in this section \.','as that

Catiline on the testimony of Cicero himself was not the totally wicked character that he has been painted in the popular imagination.
In viewing the evidence presented by Sallust,
a like decision must be rendered as in the case of Cicero.
Though Catiline stands to all appearances convicted still
enough evidence in his favor has been found to justify

a

fairer and more generous treatment than that accorded by
Sallust.

For Sallust, too, was writing with a partisan bias.
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If he was to clear his patron's name from guilt in connection
with the conspiracy he necessarily head to be severe in his
treatment of Catiline.

He had a second motive for treating

Catiline harshly if Catiline and Caesar, the recognized leader of the popular party, had severed relations.
was the mouthpiece of the popular party.

For Sallust

It has even been

contended that Sallust had in mind ~hen he undertook· his
writings the glorification of the popular party and its a.ims.
Though Catiline may have had in mind nothing more treasonable
to the state than an armed secession of his party from the
city modeled on those of earlier days, yet beca.use such a
movement would, at best, be seriously inconvenient for the
two traditional parties, the Optimates and the Populares,
these two tulited for the moment to crush him.

Since Cicero

was the speaker for the Optimates cmd Sallust of the Populares,
it would be but natural that Catiline should suffer in the
telling of the tale, especially since all our known facts concerning the conspiracy derive from these two.
All these considerations would, we believe,
justify us in concluding that though Catiline did lead a
movement against the government, yet, his actions might well
demand a far more lenient interpretation than has generally
been put upon them.

That his movement was badly timed and

his aims misdirected does not justify us in labeling him the
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arch criminal of all times.
been a hero.

Had he succeeded he might have

Only a few years later the ~reat Caesar actually

did carry into efect many of the reforms that Catiline had
advocated.

5-18
NOTES TO CHAPTER V
1.

Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, c. xv

2.

Sallust,

3.

Sallust, ££• cit., c. xvi

4.

Cf. Rolfe, Sallust, Introduction

5.

Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol.IV, c.v, p.l84

6.

Sallust, ££• cit., c.iv

7.

ibid.

8.

Boissier, La Conjuration de Catilina, p. 15

9.

Cf. Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy, p. 28

10.

P~len,

.Q.£.

w.,

cit., c. xiv

"In Defense of Catilinen, in Classical Journal
VOL. XXXIV, No. 2, Nov. 1938, p. 71

11. Sallust, .2.E.· cit., c. XXXV
12. Sallust, .2.£· cit., c. xlviii
13. Cicero, Ad. Fam.

v,

6, 2.

14. Cicero, Epis. Ad Quintum Fratrem, I, 1, 6
15. Cf. Allen, 2..12.• cit., p. 78
16. Sallust, .2..2.· cit., c.

XXXV

17. Sallust, .2.1?.· cit., c • lviii
18. Sallust, .2..2.• cit., c.xx

19. Sallust, .2..2.• cit., c. xxxiii
20. ibid.
21. Allen, ££• cit., p. 82
22. Koehler, M. A., Catiline in Classic Tradition, c. xvi,
p. 40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbot, F.F., Roman Politics, Marshall Jones Company, Boston
1923.
Allen, Walter Jr., "In Defense of Catiline", Classical Journal
Vol. ~XXIV, November 1938, No.2, pg. 70.
Appian of Alexandria, Roman History, (Translated from Greek
by Horace Wtrlte) Vol. II, Civil Wars, Bk. II,
Mac millan 1899.
Asconius, Quintus Pedianus, Commentarii, Ed. Caesar Giarratano
Publicati da Ettore Pais and Da F. Stella
Maranca, Roma, 1920.
Beesley, Edward Spencer, Catiline, Clodius and Tiberius,
Reprint G. E. Stechert and Company, New York,l924
Boissier, Gaston, La Conjuration de Catilina, Librairie Hachette et Cie Paris 1908.
Church, Alfred J., Roman Life in the Days of Cicero, John B.
Alden, New York 1889.
Cicero, Orationes in Catilinam, Pro Flacco, Pro M:urena, Pro
Sulla, Pro Cluentio, Pro Caelio, Pro Milone,
Epistulae ad Atticum-Recognovit C.F.W. Mueller,
Teubner, Lipsiae 1896.
Dio Cassius, Roman History, English Translation by Ernest
Cary, Vol. 3, Bk. XXXVII, Ch.29-42.
Ferrero, G., Greatness and Decline of Rome, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, New York 1920.
Hardy, E. G., The Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1924.
Heitland, W.E., Roman Republic, Vol.III, Cambridge 1909.
Holmes, T. Rire, The Roman Republic, Vol.I, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1923.
Jones, Francis L., "The First Conspiracy of Catiiine",
Classical Journal, Vol.XX:X:IV, April 1939, No. 7,
pg. 410.

BIBLIOGRAPHY--II
Kingsley, M. E., Latin Outline Studies, Numbers 3 and 4,
Cicero's Catilinarian Orations, Palmer Company, Boston, 1908.
Koehler, M. A., Catilina in Classic Tradition, New York
University, 1919.
Marsh, Frank Burr, 11 The Gangster in Roman Politics", Classical
Journal, Vol. XXVIII, December 1932, No. 3,
pg. 161.
Mommsen, Theodor, The History of Rome, Translated by William
P. Dickson, Vol. IV, Part I, Richard Bentley
and Son, London, 1875.
Paterculus, Velleius, Compendium of Roman History, Translated
by Frederick Shipley, Loeb Classical Library,
G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1924.
Plutarch, Lives of Cicero, Caesar, Cato the Younger, Dryden
Translation, National Library Edition,
Bigelow, Brown and Company, New York.
Rolfe, John C., Cicero and His Influence,
Company, Boston 1923.

~arsha'll

Jones

Sallust, Bellum Catilinae and Bellum Iugurthinum 2 Ed. Charles
Anthon, Harper and Brothers, New York 1854.
Sihler, E. G., Cicero of Arpinum, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1914.
strachan-Davidson, Jame Leigh, Cicero and the Fall of the
Roman Republic, G. P. Putnarnst Sons~New York,
1894.
suetonius, Lives of the Caesar, C. Julius Caesar, Opera Omnia.
c. Suetonii Tranquilli, Vol. I, Delphini
Classics, Cd. Baumgarten-Crusius Curante et
Imprimente A. J. Valpy, A. M., London 1826.

The thesis, "The Guilt of Catiline, The Catilinarian Conspiracy as Viewed by Cicero and Sallust",
written by Thomas Edward Griffin, S.J., has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form,
and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content.

It is, therefore,acoepted in par-

tial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

Father Walsh, S.J.

September 11, 1940

Father James J. Doyle, S.J.

September 12, 1940

